

TOWARDS EFFICIENT SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR INCREMENTAL SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

THE CASE OF ZEN CART APPLICATION

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

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Software Development

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


MOTIVATION

- Software development is iterative and incremental
- Code changes invalidates software security assurance
 - Security mechanisms become invalid
 - Security evaluations become invalid or obsolete




MODEL-BASED SOLUTION– SECURE CHANGE



<http://www.securechange.eu/>

USE OF SECURITY ASSURANCE CASES


- Example of assurance case for employees management – iteration 1



- Rectangles are for claims
- Circles are for evidence


USE OF SECURITY ASSURANCE CASES

- Use of Login Web page instead of OS login



- The shapes representing changed artifacts have dashed lines

ZEN CART – COLLABORATION DIAGRAM??



SECURE CODE CHANGE AT ZEN CART

- No use of architecture diagrams => they become obsolete rapidly
- Use OWASP 10 threats and PA-DSS requirements
- Results of the interview with the security lead (March 2016)
 1. Changes to security requirement of the payment card industry (PA-DSS) implies a complete reassessment
 2. Code changes may impact security mechanisms
 3. Framework changes may require redesign of security mechanisms
 4. One of each 50 comment-changes are related to security

SECURE CODE CHANGE AT ZEN CART


- Lessons learned
 1. Test security requirements are misleading
 2. Architecture diagrams have a short life time
 3. Security solutions shall be at from architecture level
 - You need either few sanitization APIs or inefficient fragmented and repeated code
 4. New techniques could identify vulnerabilities in old code
 - E.g., dynamic code analysis for XSS

THREAT MODELING

- Failed attempts for architecture extraction
 - Used PHP Pear module and AgroUML
 - Class diagram was very big and no obvious patterns
- Failed automated extraction of attack surface
 - Used PHPCallGraph, RIPS, and doxygen
 - Call graph very big due to number of functions

=> Developed a conceptual DFD

THREAT MODELING – DATA FLOW DIAGRAM



THREAT MODELING – DATA FLOW DIAGRAM

- Applied STRIDE method to extract threats
 - Used Microsoft threat modeling tool
- Main threats
 - Spoofing of destination (07)
 - Elevation using impersonation (04)
 - Potential excessive resource consumption (04)
 - Weak access control (03)
 - Memory tampering of processes (03)

=> Conceptual threats


ANALYSIS OF KNOWN VULNERABILITIES

- 35 vulnerabilities in NVD database (Dec. 2004 to Apr. 2015)
 - 17 design-based flaws (about 50%)
 - 17 code-based flows (about 50%)
 - 1 unknown
- Main vulnerabilities
 - SQL injection (7) XSS (7) Data validation (4)
 - Authentication issue (3) information leakage (3) path traversal (2 from 3)
- No. of Vulnerabilities decreases over time => product becomes mature ?


=> Mature with respect to known vul. And known discovery techniques

PENETRATION TESTING


- Performed 25 tests cases XSS and SQL injection for version 1.5.4
 - No issues
- Automated the process using Selenium and JSoup



VISUAL DESIGN OF SECURITY ASSURANCE CASES



MAPPING OF USER STORIES TO ASSURANCE CASES



SUMMARY

- Three changes impact the security assurance of software
 - Requirement changes
 - Code changes
 - Security mechanism changes
- Zen card had 35 Vulnerability in the NVD
 - 17 are code-level
 - 17 are design-level
- User stories could be mapped to security assurance artifacts
- More empirical research is needed to get insights

Thank you

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